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ABSTRACT 
In this study we investigated the relationship between language and thought and whether 
it changes with language experience over time.  As language skill matures in children, does their 
linguistic representation of an event influence their non-linguistic representation of the same 
event?  We also investigated the nature of this influence; that is, does the linguistic perspective 
globally inform all non-linguistic tasks?  Does it locally inform those nearby in time?  Two-year-
olds (mean age 31.91 mos) and four-year-olds (mean age 53.17 mos) were presented with 
Directed Motion (DM) events and analyzed them in a linguistic and a non-linguistic domain.  
DM events consist of a body in motion moving between points in space.  The motion contains a 
trajectory, the Path, and the characteristic quality of the motion, the Manner.  The linguistic task 
was elicited description, and the non-linguistic task was the forced imitation choice with two 
phases.  In the first phase (Direct) children exactly imitated a DM event performed with a stuffed 
animal on a foam core ramp.  In the second phase (Choice) children imitated modeled events on 
an environment that differed from the experimenter's in such a way that they could only imitate 
either the Path or the Goal of the modeled event.  The study found that two-year-olds did not 
prefer components in either task, but showed an order of task effect.  When they imitated first, 
they directly imitated all components correctly more often and described Path more often.  Four-
year-olds did not show this order of task effect.  This suggests that for younger children, the 
strategy used for whatever task they performed first carried over into the subsequent task. Older 
children did not perseverate, having already solidified the means with which they carry out tasks 
in different domains.  Also, this suggests that gaining language experience changes the 
relationship between language and thought over time.  
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Introduction 
 Although one of the goals of language use is to organize observations for the efficient 
presentation of information, the information that ends up getting conveyed does not perfectly 
reflect the observation.  Something as simple as a ball dropping onto the floor can be described 
in infinitely many ways, ranging from terse - "The ball dropped to the floor." - to elaborate - 
"The small red ball rolled off of the table and fell at a rate of three feet per second to the tile 
floor, whereupon it bounced."  Though the speaker can go into great length and detail describing 
the event, especially if prompted to, there will always be aspects of the event that were noticed 
but chosen not to be included in the description (e.g. in the latter description I mentioned that the 
floor was tile but not that the table was wooden).  Furthermore, there is no perfect 
characterization of an event.  Events as they exist in the world are made up of an infinite number 
of factors, many of which could be talked about.  There are factors that exist outside the scope of 
human perception, such as the molecular composition of the ball, contextual factors that may not 
be relevant to mention or have already been mentioned, such as the fact that the ball belongs to 
me and it was a gift, and spatial and temporal boundaries that define the event, such as the fact 
that the ball fell today at 3:01 PM and indoors.  Because there are no intrinsic aspects of events 
that are obligatory to mention, it is up to the viewer, and more specifically the mapping of event 
representations onto syntactic forms in the viewer’s native language, to impose such architecture 
upon the event.  These syntactic forms are finite in number, and since languages are set up 
differently to express events, speakers are encouraged talk and possibly think about events in 
such a way that reflects their language’s structure. 
 Different languages can create different pictures of the same events.  For example, 
consider the following event: a boy climbs a tree and rests at the top.  In English, a speaker is 
2 
 
 
 
likely to describe trajectory of the motion as in (1), while in Spanish a speaker is more likely to 
describe the endstate of the motion as in (2), from (Slobin 1996). 
(1) The boy climbed the tree. 
(2)  El   niño  está subido           en               el árbol.  
 (The boy  is     climb-PART in/on          the tree.) 
 "The boy climbed the tree." 
 What accounts for these differences?  We can assume that the two speakers experience 
the event similarly, in that they both have human sensory organs.  Moreover, infants and young 
children without much experience with the language will have similar mental representations of 
the event.  But when speakers mature, will the accumulated habits of using their language change 
the way they read the input, so that certain pieces of the event are more salient and others 
ignored, uniquely from speakers of other languages?  That is, does language learning affect how 
we think about the world? 
 This thesis investigates these questions.  First we explain Direct Motion events 
(henceforth DM events) and their value to the study of language and thought.  We then provide 
an overview of the leading theories about the relationship between language and thought and the 
Whorfian linguistic determinism hypothesis.  Then, we discuss difficulties inherent in studying 
language and thought, some potential methodological solutions, and finally introduce the current 
study.  From there we present our Methods, Results, and Discussion. 
Directed Motion Events 
 As previously discussed, languages differ systematically in their representations of 
events.  Talmy (1985) described two major typological categories for languages with different 
rhetorical representations of space, and more specifically of DM events.  DM events are defined 
by a Figure, something which undergoes motion, moving between Grounds, points of reference 
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in space.  A Ground may be the location where the Figure begins moving (these are known as 
Sources), where the Figure stops moving (Goals), or simply locations past which the Figure 
moves.  The motion itself can be characterized along two different dimensions, Manner and Path.  
Manner refers to the idiosyncratic character of the motion (e.g. walking vs. jumping in English, 
verbs describing specific actions).  Path is the directionality of the motion (e.g. entering vs. 
exiting in English, note that these do not describe a specific action).  There also exist verbs that 
describe both (though arguably not in English). 
Returning to typology, languages are categorized according to where Path information is 
encoded in the utterance.  Verb-Framed languages, such as Spanish, Greek, and Japanese, encode 
Path in the main verb and Manner in optional constructions such as prepositional phrases, 
adjuncts, or secondary verbs.  Satellite-Framed languages, such as German and English, encode 
Manner in the main verb and Path optionally.  Consider the following example sentence in 
English, a Satellite-Framed language: 
(3) The boy ran from the house to the street. 
In this example, the Figure of the DM event is the boy.  Two Grounds are mentioned, a Source 
and a Goal.  The Source is encoded by from the house, where the boy began moving, and the 
Goal is to the street, where the boy finished moving.  The Manner of the motion is encoded by 
the action verb ran, which is the main verb.  The Path is implied by mention of the Source and 
Goal, but no trajectory is explicitly mentioned.  Now consider this same sentence in Japanese, a 
Verb-Framed language: 
(4) Otokonoko-wa  uchi    kara michi made hashitte itta. 
 (boy-GEN         house from street to       running went) 
 “The boy ran from the house to the street.” 
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In this sentence, the same elements are represented.  The Figure, otoko no ko, "the boy," 
the Source, uchi kara, "from the house," and the Goal, michi made, "to the street," are all 
expressed similarly to the English example, but the Manner and the Path are expressed 
differently.  Rather than in the main verb, the Manner is expressed by the gerund form hashitte, 
"running."  The Path is expressed by the main verb itta, "went."  Itta and other forms of the 
Japanese verb meaning "to go" express information about the trajectory of the motion relative to 
the position of the speaker, whereas forms of the verb go in English do not.  Over time, 
typological differences between languages contribute to preferences for event components in 
their rhetorical styles.  In other words, there are language-specific patterns determining what 
event components speakers encode in their descriptions.  If these preferences are also present in 
their non-linguistic intuitions about events, it would signal a linguistic influence on their non-
linguistic thought. 
Non-linguistic cognition also has an influence on linguistic descriptions.  For example, in 
their 2005 study, Lakusta and Landau showed typically developing children, children with 
William’s Syndrome, and typically developing adults 34 movies of DM events and asked them 
to describe them.  In all types of movies – change of possession events, change of state events, 
and attachment/detachment events, both the Source and the Goal were salient, and all 
participants were much more likely to mention Goal Paths and omit Source Paths.  There may 
also be pre-linguistic tendencies that children have as they approach learning how to use 
language to describe DM events.  Wagner and Lakusta (2009) have argued that pre-linguistic 
infants have event representations that make use of the same information as their caregiver’s 
language’s semantic categories of DM events as described by Talmy (1985) (Manner, Path, 
Goal, etc.).  Choi and Bowerman (1991) provided further evidence of this.  They recorded the 
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speech of two English-speaking and two Korean-speaking children longitudinally from the age 
of about 1 to 2 years and discovered that English and Korean children encode Path in their event 
descriptions differently, and according to the lexicalization patterns of their respective languages 
as described by Talmy’s typology.  The English speaking children used Path particles to encode 
Path in a variety of events, whereas Korean children used Path verbs first with caused, transitive 
motion, and learn verbs for intransitive and spontaneous motion later.  Choi and Bowerman 
concluded that these patterns, which align with those shown by adult speakers of English and 
Korean, suggest that children attend to language-specific constraints on representing space well 
before they learn how to encode space in language. 
Note that in either language the typological of encoding information are not completely 
rigid.  That speakers become accustomed to the descriptive conventions of their language does 
not mean that the conventions are obligatory.  Natural descriptions of events can be uttered that 
do not conform to typological expectations.  Consider (7), one such sentence in English: 
(7) Sam entered the room. 
 Being a Satellite-Framed language, English is expected to express Path information 
outside of the main verb.  In this case, the verb “entered” defies that expectation by describing 
the trajectory of Sam with respect to the room – first he was outside the room and then he was 
inside the room.  These descriptions are generally less frequent, require greater syntactic 
marking, and are longer than their typologically typical counterparts.   
The Whorfian Hypothesis 
 The Sapir-Whorf linguistic determinism hypothesis attempts to explain the relationship 
between language and thought by making the strong claim that native speakers of two different 
languages are compelled to attend only to those dimensions of their experience that suit the 
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syntactic categories of their language and ignore those that do not.  A weaker version of the 
hypothesis, sometimes referred to as Neo-Whorfian linguistic relativism, suggests that the effect 
is less rigid, facilitated both by linguistic experience and cognitive constraints on experiencing 
the event.  A corollary of this theory is that cognition is affected gradually over time as more 
language experience is gained.  According to this interpretation, all speakers begin with a 
baseline method for analyzing of events that is unaffected by language-specific perspectives.  As 
a speaker gains experience with his or her native language, over time this baseline method will 
be blended with gradual interference from the language’s constrained perspective of the world, in 
space and motion as Talmy describes, but also in all other domains of thought.  This hypothesis 
predicts that speakers will increasingly draw upon this linguistic method even in non-linguistic 
situations (Slobin, 1996, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).  It also predicts that speakers will make use of 
this method to fulfill the demands of any task, and regardless of the demands of any recent tasks.  
For this reason we will refer to this perspective as the Global relationship between language and 
thought.   
There is another possible explanation of the relationship between language and thought, 
described by Gennari et al. (2002) as the Language as Strategy Hypothesis.  It suggests that 
speakers can rely on the way they prepare to use language to help them perform certain non-
linguistic thought tasks that rely on similar demands as language.  For example, Lucy (1992) 
demonstrated that speakers rely on their particular language's existing semantic categories to 
categorize novel objects.  Adult speakers of English and Yucatec Maya were presented with 17 
triads of objects, one original and two alternates: one that different in its shape and one that 
differed in its material composition.  An example triad would be ceramic bowl (original), a 
ceramic plate (shape alternate), and a metal bowl (material alternate).  Participants were asked to 
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decide which alternate was more similar to the original object.  English speakers reliably chose 
the material alternate, and the Yucatec Maya speakers chose the shape alternate.  Lucy concluded 
that because English forms object contrasts on the basis of shape more than material 
composition, and Yucatec Maya material more than shape, that these linguistic habits drove 
participants to find distinct salient differences among the same objects.   But only in executing 
certain tasks can the speaker benefit from relying on their linguistic perspective.  Papafragou & 
Selimis (2010) asked Greek and English speaking participants to view 48 motion events, 
describe them, and then match each one to one of two other events, each of which varied by 
either the Manner or the Path.  Participants categorized them according to verb lexicalization 
patterns in their native language - English speakers grouped events with similar Manners and 
Greek speakers with similar Paths.  However in a second experiment participants were not asked 
to describe the events and any linguistic cueing was removed from the procedure.  In that case 
the effect did not appear.  Importantly, this finding demonstrates the effect of the language in the 
instructions and descriptions contributing on performance in a subsequent, non-linguistic task, 
but not a Global effect from language onto a non-linguistic task even without direct linguistic 
cues.  This strategy formation based on the presence of linguistic cueing we will refer to as the 
Local relationship between language and thought. 
Global and Local effects from language onto thought do not have to be exclusive of one 
another.  It is possible that for some tasks mature speakers' interpretations of events are always 
affected by their language (Global), but for other tasks, a recent, direct appeal to linguistic 
knowledge is needed for the linguistic influence to appear (Local).  Gennari et al. (2002) 
demonstrated this by presenting English and Spanish adults with 36 videotapes of DM events.  
Participants were in one of three conditions, one where they had to describe each event, one 
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where they did not, and one where they instead were asked to repeat nonsense syllables after 
each event.  Then, all participants were shown 108 DM events, 36 of which they were shown 
previously, and were asked to indicate for each event whether they had seen the event before.  
Lastly, they provided similarity judgments on the same set of events.  They found that speakers 
of either language that described beforehand did not recognize events better according to the 
information they encoded in their descriptions.  However, they did judge events with the same 
information encoded in their descriptions as similar more often.  This suggests that some non-
linguistic tasks may access to language all the time, whereas others do not unless something 
triggers a linguistic analysis of the event first. 
Experimental Concerns 
 There are certain difficulties inherent in studying language and thought.  One of these is 
studying language in isolation of other thought processes.  Gleitman et al. (2007) showed in an 
eye tracking study that event apprehension and processes of linguistic planning do not operate 
serially, but cooperatively and in unison.  They presented participants with a fixation cross in the 
center of a screen followed by black box for only 60-75 milliseconds on either the left or right 
side of the screen followed by a scene involving two subjects, one on either side, that they 
described.  The box directed their gaze to one of the two figures at onset of the scene, therefore 
making it more salient at first.  The scenes consisted of an action carried out by an agent onto a 
patient (for example, a dog chasing a man).  The prediction was that if language and scene 
apprehension happen separately, then participants should describe the scenes according to the 
highest frequency patterns, such as active voice over passive voice, animates mentioned before 
inanimate objects, etc (in the example case, "a dog chased a man" is higher frequency than "a 
man was chased by a dog").  Even the though participants reported not noticing the black box, it 
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successfully guided them to describe the scene beginning with the figure in the location that the 
black box had appeared in just before the trial.  Furthermore, participants described the figure to 
which their attention was directed even when it resulted in the lower frequency description ("a 
man was chased by a dog").  This suggests that participants were gaining an initial "gist" of the 
scene at the same time they were formulating their description, both within 200 milliseconds of 
viewing the event.   
 Another issue is that processes of language must make use of non-linguistic cognition 
(e.g. a gist must be obtained first to form a description).  Participants unconsciously use 
linguistic knowledge to perform a task, which makes it difficult ascertain whether an effect from 
language onto thought is Global or Local.  A careful manipulation is therefore needed: on the 
one hand, linguistic interference must be minimized in a non-linguistic task to find a Global 
effect, and on the other hand it must be clearly telegraphed if it is introduced to evoke a Local 
effect. 
 Experimental Solutions 
 One common way to test this effect from language onto thought is comparing the non-
linguistic intuitions of adult speakers of Verb-Framed and Satellite-Framed languages.  If Global 
linguistic relativism holds true, mature speakers that have already formed their habits of 
expression will think non-linguistically different about events from speakers of other languages.  
Work analyzing adults has generated somewhat split findings.  Papafragou et al. (2002) 
presented two experiments, one asking participants to describe pictures of DM events, and 
another asking different participants to perform a memory task in which they are shown pictures 
of DM events and later asked if they recognize a new set of events.  The Greek and English 
speakers performed according to typological expectations in describing the DM events, but this 
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did not predict memory performance, which was similar between English and Greek speakers.  
This is evidence against the relativist claim that there is a Global effect from language onto 
thought.  On the other hand, Billman and Krych (1998) do claim to find an effect from language 
onto later recognition memory of events.  They showed participants a video of 24 events 
accompanied by spoken verbs and then the next day showed them 24 movies, 8 of which were 
the previously viewed targets and 8 foil events that contained either a different Path or Manner, 
and asked them how certain they were that they had seen the event before.  Participants were 
more correct in distinguishing the event if it was a foil of the same information encoded by the 
verb than when it was a foil of different information.  In the control condition in which no 
language accompanied the presentation of the event, participants were equally as accurate at 
distinguishing foil events of either kind from model events.  This demonstrated that when 
linguistic information was provided when viewing the event, it was stored as part of the event 
representation along with the visual information.  The Local perspective can account somewhat 
for this finding.  Recall that the effect of language on thought is Local and sensitive to priming, 
so if a direct appeal is made to linguistic knowledge when initially analyzing the event, it will be 
used to make subsequent non-linguistic analyses about the event.  All the same, the results leave 
the debate about linguistic relativism an open question. 
 Another possible analysis is that of comparing younger children and older children within 
the same language.  Having more language experience, older children should show stronger 
Global and Local effects of language than younger children who have less language experience.  
This is useful because of children’s understanding of space and encoding of space.   
Understanding space is a fundamental cognitive faculty that is available to infants (Papafragou & 
Selimis, 2010). Language is not.  Although terms describing space (such as “up” and “down” in 
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English) are learned very early on cross-linguistically along with some notions of language-
specific spatial semantic categories, it takes more experience to ultimately master typical 
language patterns of mature speakers.  Therefore, younger speakers may have non-linguistic 
expectations about space non-linguistically, but it will take time for linguistic structural patterns 
to change these expectations.  Moreover, if change does occur over time, younger speakers 
should perform differently than older speakers.  There is some evidence to suggest that as 
language skill increases conformance to typological norms of expression does as well.   
Papafragou et al. (2006) showed that young speakers of English and Greek, in a task where they 
described events, increasingly aligned to the lexicalization patterns of their respective languages 
with age.  Choi and Bowerman (1991) found in their broader study of recording a Korean child’s 
and an English child’s language from the age of 1-2 years that right from when children began to 
speak they were sensitive to adult speakers’ means of describing space and described it 
differently from their language counterparts.  The English speaking child used prepositions to 
describe Path from very early on, whereas the Korean child used a variety of Path verbs.  On the 
other hand, Slobin (1996) argued through his study of children of many different languages 
describing Mercer Mayer’s picture book Frog, where are you? (which does not contain text, only 
illustrations of events) that although children may show some features of mature language use 
from when they begin speaking, it is not until around the age of three years that they master the 
rhetorical style of their language.  Rhetorical style in this context refers to the dimensions of 
space that are either expressed, made implicit, or omitted by typical language use of a certain 
language group.  The style is learned partly by what is obligatorily encoded by verbs in the 
language according to Talmy’s typology, but also culturally from the accumulated input of how 
mature speakers describe events (for example, adults around me always mentioned trajectories in 
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their event descriptions, so now unconsciously so do I).  As older children gain more experience 
with their language's rhetorical style, they should show stronger Global and Local effects of 
language, if they exist. 
 As previously discussed, it can be difficult to find a non-linguistic task that is free of 
linguistic influence.  A unique alternative to previously used measures is the imitation choice 
paradigm used by Wagner et al (2008).  They presented 34 two-year-olds with DM events acted 
out using a stuffed animal on a foam board.  The board consisted of two level planes connected 
by a ramp, and a differently colored plastic bowl on each level, one face-up and the other face-
down to appear distinguishable.  The modeled DM events consisted of one of two possible 
Manners, hopping the animal or sliding the animal, one of two possible Paths, going up the ramp 
or down the ramp, and one of two possible Goals, the bowl on top or on bottom.  The Goal 
objects never moved, and the modeled events always respected the flow of the Path and Goal 
(i.e. an "up" Path always led to the goal on top and vice versa), so there were four possible event 
configurations.  In the first, Direct phase of the task, participants were modeled each of the four 
possible DM events and after each one were asked to imitate the event on the same board.  In the 
second, Choice phase, participants were instructed to carry out their imitations on a separate 
board given to them, which differed from the experimenter's in that the Goal objects switched 
positions.  The events were again modeled to the participants and they were asked to repeat the 
event on their board, forcing them to make a choice: they could either imitate the modeled Path 
at the expense of the Goal, or imitate the modeled Goal at the expense of the Path.  Overall, the 
children showed a significant bias for Path over Goal in their choice imitations.  This paradigm is 
useful as a non-linguistic measure because it breaks ground by moving away from previously 
used non-linguistic measures such as memory recognition and categorization, in case these 
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methodologies somehow call upon linguistic processes in participants (say, if memory is partly 
stored using language or categorization always accesses lexical processing).  Planning for 
imitation should not access any linguistic strategy. 
Present Study 
 The current study examined two-year-olds and four-year-olds analyzing the same DM 
events in a linguistic and a non-linguistic task.  Based on Slobin's assertion that mastery of 
rhetorical style happens somewhere around the age of 3 years, there should be adequate 
linguistic development between our two age groups.  The linguistic task was elicited description, 
and the non-linguistic task was the imitation choice paradigm used by Wagner et al (2008).  Past 
work has used static scenes of DM events for description stimuli (Papafragou et al., 2002; 
Gleitman et al., 2007), but the current study used movie clips to preserve the natural dynamicity 
of natural motion events, and to make them more parallel to the modeled events in the imitation 
task.  Participants also performed both tasks using the same events, providing a direct, within 
subjects comparison.  The order of tasks was counterbalanced, so if a Local effect exists it should 
appear for participants in the description first condition. 
 Predictions 
Based on previous work, our assumptions about how DM events are structured, and the 
capabilities of children in each age group, we have some predictions about children’s 
performance in this study.  Older children should have longer descriptions, include more 
components in their descriptions, and perform better in Direct imitation simply because of their 
higher cognitive skills over younger children.  With respect to the existence of Global and Local 
effects, several hypotheses can be made: 
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Hypothesis I:  If there is a Global effect but not a Local effect from language onto 
thought, then older children should prefer different information than younger children for both 
task orders.  Older children should show a stronger effect because greater language experience 
should bring to bear a greater linguistic influence onto their thought. 
Hypothesis II:  If there is a Local but not a Global effect, then older children should 
prefer different information than younger children, but only in the description first condition.  
Since Local effects depend on the prominence of the linguistic perspective when carrying out a 
non-linguistic task, the description first condition only should provide this prominence. 
Hypothesis III:  If there are both Global and Local effects, we expect the same outcome 
as Hypothesis I, but the effect should be stronger in the description first condition because of the 
linguistic priming. 
Hypothesis IV:  If there are neither Global nor Local effects, than the two age groups 
should prefer the same information in both tasks, and regardless of task order. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
15 two-year-old children and 16 four-year-old children participated in this study, 17 of 
which were boys and 14 of which were girls. There were 7 girls and 7 boys in the imitation first 
condition, and 8 girls and 9 boys in the description first condition.  The top of the two-year-old 
age range was 35.57 mos, the bottom was 27.8 mos, and the mean was 31.91 mos.  The top of 
the four-year-old range was 58.6 mos, the bottom was 45.27 mos, and the mean was 53.17 mos.  
Participants were all recruited and run at a satellite research space at the Little Kidspace© at the 
Center for Science and Industry (COSI) children’s museum in Columbus, Ohio.  The experiment 
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lasted about three minutes, during which the parents almost always chose to be present, and 
afterward the children were offered hand stamps for their participation. 
Another 61 children participated but were not included in the study.  25 of these refused 
to participant beyond the very initial stages of the experiment (i.e., being introduced to the 
stimuli), another 2 only completed less than half of the imitation task trials, 25 completed less 
than half of the description task trials, and all but one of those were two-year-olds, a testament to 
how difficult the description task was for the younger participants.  Another two two-year old 
participants were removed because all of their descriptions were unintelligible and were 
therefore unable to be coded.  Seven participants were removed due to experimenter error. 
Stimuli 
 For the imitation task DM motion events were presented by moving a Cookie Monster 
stuffed toy on foam core ramps that were roughly 12 inches long, 11 inches wide, and 9 inches 
high.  The boards contained a lower level and an upper level connected by a straight ramp, 
providing two possible Paths – up or down – and one Goal object on both the upper or lower 
level where the motion would terminate.  During the Choice phase of the imitation task the 
experimenter would model the event on a board with one Goal object orientation, and the 
participant would have to imitate it on a separate board on which the Goal objects were in the 
opposite locations.  The Goal objects were either an orange baby food bowl turned upside-down 
or a red bowl right side up (see Figure 1).  A board was also created for the Direct phase of the 
imitation task, which had the same dimensions of the other boards (see Figure 2). 
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For the description task a woman from the lab was recorded moving a Curious George 
stuffed animal on one foam environment that was identical to one of the Choice phase foam 
boards, each clip being a DM event modeled by the experimenter in the Choice phase of the 
imitation task.  These videos preserved the audio of the animal making contact with the board 
but no speech or other sounds.  The clips were cut in Final Cut Studio. 
For both tasks, the DM events displayed were controlled so that they all presented the 
same number of event components, but between movies the content of the components varied.  
There were two possibilities for each component - the Manner of motion was either hopping or 
sliding, the Path the animal travelled was either up or down the ramp, and the Goal of the motion 
was one of the two bowl objects.  However, the direction of the Path would also determine the 
Goal of the event so that the trajectory always ended at the expected destination, for example the 
animal would always move up the ramp to end up at the top bowl and vice versa.  Combining 
these possibilities created 4 events, all of which were both modeled to participants in the 
imitation task and shown as movie clips in the description task. 
Figure 1: Direct imitation environment   Figure 2: Choice imitation and description task 
and Figure      environments 
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Procedure 
Participants all performed the description and the imitation task, and were balanced so 
that half performed the linguistic task first and the other performed the non-linguistic task first.  
This way it was possible to have a within subjects analysis of children's linguistic and non-
linguistic responses to the same events, and also see if there was a local effect from language 
onto thought in either age group. 
 Description Task: 
 The linguistic task was a simple description task, in which children were shown 4 clips 
of DM events, and after each clip were asked to describe what they saw.  Specifically, children 
were asked, "What happened?" "Tell me what that movie was about," or "What did you see?" 
Questions did not include content pertaining to the agent, animal, motion, or foam environment 
to avoid cueing children on what to describe.  Children were allowed to see the movie three 
times total if they refused to describe the clip after viewing it.  After three viewings the 
experimenter moved on to a different clip and would not return to it.  In order for their data to be 
included in the data analysis, children had to provide a description for at least two of the four 
clips.  In a further effort to reduce noise from younger participants, a further caveat was 
introduced.  Younger children also had to provide at least one description that included event 
components.  This eliminated two younger participants whose descriptions were very short such 
as, “Monkey,” and did not provide content about the event components. 
 Imitation Task - Direct Phase 
The non-linguistic task was the forced choice imitation task used by Wagner et al. (2008).  
First, in the Direct phase, the experimenter modeled two DM events on the practice board and 
after each asked participants to repeat it on the same board.  Each time the participant was asked 
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to perform, the experimenter would only provide simple instructions that would not include any 
event components, draw attention to any portion of the board, or mention the stuffed animal.  
Examples of the instructions include: “Now it’s your turn to play,” “Can you play the same 
game?” “Play that game for me now,” etc.  The experimenter then presented the same two events 
once more.  Sometimes participants, especially the younger ones, would engage in creative play 
in the Choice phase in which they enacted components not modeled by the experimenter or 
different events altogether, such as playing under the ramp or off of the playground.  Such 
creative play was considered uncodable.  The Direct phase provided a non-linguistic inclusion 
measure that was parallel to that of the description task, in that neither Direct imitation or 
description methodologically pressured participants to encode particular components. 
 Imitation Task - Choice Phase 
In the Choice phase, children were given a board of their own to imitate the events on 
that was different from the experimenter's, in that the goal objects were in opposite locations.  In 
this way, the children must choose between imitating the modeled Goal correctly at the expense 
of the Path, or vice versa.  The experimenter modeled four DM events on his own board, after 
each of which he asked participants to repeat it on their board.  Some children, especially four-
year-olds, looked incredulous, or tried to move the positions of the Goal objects to match the 
experimenter's board, or stated "I can't do it."  In these few cases they were assured that they 
could and were instructed to give it their best try.  All children who raised an objection of this 
nature still completed the task.  Children had to complete at least 2 of the four Choice trails along 
with 2 description trials to be included in the analysis. 
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Coding 
 Description Task:  For analysis the descriptions were broken down into clauses.  Each 
clause was coded for inclusion of Path, Manner, and Goal event components.  A clause for the 
purposes of this study comprised a main verb and all of its arguments and complements.  In other 
words, every time a new main verb was encountered it was considered a new clause of the 
description.  A sentence fragment was coded as one clause, and repetitions or self-corrections of 
clauses were not coded.  Breaking the descriptions into clauses provided a better comparative 
measure of linguistic prowess between two and four-year-olds, and a way to see when in their 
descriptions they encoded specific information.  To this end, average clauses per description, 
number of components per description, and number of components per clause were also recorded 
for all participants.  Inclusion was coded by a score of 1 or 0 for each component in each clause, 
and by what syntactic feature it was included.  Explanations for each event component follow. 
 In English, Manner is usually encoded in the main verb as in hop or slide, coded in the 
current study as specific-verb, but may also be encoded by adjuncts such as by hopping, coded as 
adjunct. Not all verbs that describe motion describe Manner of motion.  Examples of these are 
go, got into, or moved.  Clauses containing such verbs were coded as non-specific.  If no motion 
verb was used, or the clause described something outside of the motion event, it was coded as 
omit. 
Path of motion was considered included if directional movement on the ramp was 
mentioned.  This was possible using very high frequency particles such as up and down, coded 
prep only, but could also be expressed by using Path verbs such as climb and fall, coded verb 
only.  Path verbs received credit for Path inclusion if they were used to describe movement on 
the ramp.  Combinations of verbs and prepositions, such as fell down, were coded verb prep.  Up 
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and down were also used in ways that did not describe the directed motion, such as sat down 
(51.73 mos), which describes the Goal of the event but not the directional movement.   Clauses 
containing these constructions would not receive credit for Path inclusion.  These clauses, along 
with clauses containing no mention of Path, were coded omit. 
For the Goal of the event, mention of the Goal objects or what the animal did at the Goal 
object earned credit for Goal inclusion.  This was achieved by using a prepositional phrase such 
as to the…, or mentioning an action at the Goal object as in the Path example sat down, where it 
is implied that the animal sat on the Goal object.  Clauses containing information about the 
physical Goal location were coded physical clause, and clauses containing more than just Goal 
information were coded physical.  Clauses without Goal information were coded omit.   
Note that it is possible for participants to form a description of the experimental events 
including all components, “He hopped up and into the bowl,” or none of them, “Look at him 
go!”.  Inclusion scores for the three event components for each clause were averaged per subject 
over all of their descriptions, which had to be at least two per subject.  In this way each subject's 
score represented how characteristic it was for that subject to provide a description for an event 
that included a certain component. 
 Imitation Task - Direct Phase 
 Direct imitation trials were coded for correct imitation of Manner, Path, and Goal event 
components.  For each trial, if the Manner was correctly imitated from the modeled event, it 
received a Manner inclusion score of 1.  Imitating multiple Manners, the incorrect Manner, or no 
Manner earned a score of 0.  These criteria were also used for Path and Goal.  These inclusion 
scores were averaged for all trials per subject. 
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 Imitation Task - Choice Phase 
 For Choice trials a Path Bias score was given for the imitations.  If the participant 
imitated the correct Path at the expense of the modeled Goal, they were given a score of 1 for 
that trial.  If they imitated the correct Goal at the expense of the Path, they earned a score of -1 
for that trial.  It was also possible to show no bias in imitation by either correctly imitating both 
Path and Goal (e.g. sliding the animal down the ramp and putting it in the top bowl, also 
breaking the flow of the event), or correctly imitating neither of the target components.  Path bias 
scores were averaged for all trials per subject.  Though Manner was not included in the Path bias 
score, for each trial a Manner inclusion score was also recorded. 
 
Results 
Imitation Task – Direct Phase 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with task order (imitation first vs. 
description first) and age group (two-year-olds vs. four-year-olds) as between subjects 
independent variables and event component (Path vs. Manner vs. Goal) as a within subjects 
independent variable.  The dependent variable was the proportion of correctly imitated elements, 
calculated from the average component inclusion scores from each participant’s imitations.  The 
analysis found a main effect of age (F(1,27) = 12.146, p = .002) – four-year-olds correctly 
imitated more elements than twos – and task order (F(1,27) = 5.234, p = .03), and an interaction 
(F(1,27) = 10.362, p = .003) between age group and task order.  The task order main effect and 
the interaction both stem from the fact that two-year-olds perform better overall in the imitation 
first condition, and four-year-olds are at ceiling in both conditions.  There was no main effect of 
component inclusion or interactions with component inclusion – components were included at 
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equal rates in both conditions.  This is not surprising since in this phase the children could and 
were encouraged to imitate all event components.  Figure 3 shows the Direct imitation inclusion 
scores for both age groups split across conditions, showing no preference for any event 
component but a drop in overall performance for two-year-olds in the description first condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imitation Task – Choice Phase 
In the Choice phase, recall that the stimuli events were set up so that participants were 
discouraged from imitating both the Path and the Goal according to the model event, but the 
Manner could be included free of conflict with other components.  Furthermore, Manner was not 
included in the calculation of the Path bias score.  In this phase, Manner was included by two-
year-olds a fair amount (mean Manner score .62) and almost all of the time by four-year-olds 
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Figure 3: Inclusion in Direct imitation by each age group, 
broken down by task order condition. 
Age Group 
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(mean Manner score .90).  Path bias scores were compared across age groups and task orders 
using a two-way ANOVA.  A main effect of age group was found (F(1,27) = 18.559, p = <.001), 
but no main effect of task order or interaction.  Four-year-olds were much more Path biased 
(mean score = .53) in Choice imitation than two-year-olds (mean score = -.02).  Next, we 
compared the Path bias score to chance.  Chance in this instance refers to an average Path bias 
score of 0, having neither a Path nor a Goal preference.  In a one sample t-test it was also found 
that the four-year-old bias was significant (t(15) = 4.977, p > .001), but the two-year-old bias 
was not (t (14) =  -.269, n.s.).This difference is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description 
 Older children included more in their descriptions than younger children, as predicted, 
and this was supported by three different dependent measures of linguistic complexity in two-
way ANOVAs.  The factors for this analysis were age group and task order.  For the first 
measure, number of clauses per description, two-year-olds uttered an average of 1.08 clauses, 
Figure 4: Average Path bias score for participants in each age group, 
in Choice imitation 
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while four-year-olds averaged 1.77 clauses (F(1, 27) = 33.732, p < .001).  For each description, 
on average two-year-olds only mentioned 1.20 event components, while four-year-olds 
mentioned 2.24 (F(1, 27) = 35.118), p < .001).  Even per clause, a stricter measurement, four-
year-olds included more components—two-year-olds included an average of 1.02 event 
components, whereas four-year-olds included 1.36 (F(1, 27) = 6.825, p = .015).  No effects of or 
interactions with task order were found using these measures, suggesting that order of task did 
not affect how much was included in participants’ descriptions.   
To analyze inclusion of event components, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
with task order (imitation first vs. description first) and age group (two-year-olds vs. four-year-
olds) as between subjects independent variables and event component (Path vs. Manner vs. Goal) 
as a within subjects independent variable.  The dependent variable was the proportion of 
correctly described elements, calculated from the average component inclusion scores from each 
participant’s descriptions.  An effect of age group was found (F(1,27) = 39.692, P < .001), and a 
three-way interaction between age group, task order, and component inclusion was found (F(2) = 
4.075, P = .022).  No other significant main effects or interactions were found.  The age group 
effect reflects the immediately previous finding that four-year-olds include more information in 
their descriptions than two-year-olds, including more of each event component.  As shown in 
Figure 5, the three-way interaction highlights the greater Path inclusion for two-year-olds in the 
imitation first condition.  To investigate this difference further, paired sample t tests comparing 
Path to other components in both conditions for the two-year-old age group revealed that Path 
was included more than Manner (t(6) = -2.520, P = .045) or Goal (t(6) = -2.763, P = .033) in the 
imitation first condition but not the description first condition, and this is shown in Figure 5.  As 
with their imitation scores, this suggests a Local effect for two-year-olds, that those who imitated 
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first were drawn to the Path of the event, or that those who described first were drawn away from 
the Path of the event.  Four-year-olds do not show this Local effect, however they hit ceiling in 
their inclusion of all components (average Manner inclusion score = .70, Path = .84, Goal = .81), 
making it difficult to determine whether they preferred any information in this task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Syntactic Encoding 
In each age group, clear trends about what forms children used to encode specific event 
components emerged.  Table 1 shows the structures used by children in each age group to encode 
Manner, Path, and Goal, by clauses.  Children in both age groups never used an adjunct such as 
“by hopping” to encode Manner, they always used the main verb (“He slid,” 53.07 mos).  To 
encode Path, the overwhelming majority of children used the prepositions “up” and “down” (e.g. 
“He went up,” 51.73 mos), though twice in each age group a Path verb was used (“He climbed 
on top of the top,” 34.43 mos).  Finally, for Goal, participants almost always used a separate 
Figure 5: Description inclusion scores by each age group, 
broken down by task order condition 
Age Group 
26 
 
 
 
clause to describe the Goal event, “He went in the bowl” (32.47 mos), but there was one 
exception in each age group in which more than just the Goal was described in a clause (“He 
went up and down and into it,” 29.8 mos).  These means of encoding events are shown in     
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task Comparison 
To analyze performance across tasks, the best comparison is the Direct imitation 
inclusion scores to the description inclusion scores, and this is for two reasons.  First, the 
procedures between these two tasks are comparable.  In these cases, participants were presented 
with DM events and asked to represent them as they were, either in a description or in an 
imitation.  They did not have to decide between the importance of modeled components as they 
were asked to do in Choice imitation.  Moreover, the inclusion scores from Direct imitation and 
Description Inclusion 
    Two-year-olds 
    Manner   Path    Goal   
Omitted 38 Omitted 26 omitted 37 
main verb 16 preposition 26 clause 16 
Adjunct 0 Verb 2 physical 1 
Total 54 Total 54 total 54 
      Four-year-olds  
    Manner   Path   Goal   
Omitted 65 Omitted 57 omitted 62 
main verb 46 preposition 52 clause 48 
Adjunct 0 Verb 2 physical 1 
Total 111 Total 111 total 111 
Table 1: Inclusion for event components in description clause 
data for each age group, and by what form 
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description are on the same scale, 0 to 1, representing either no inclusion or inclusion of a 
component.  Path bias scores are on a different scale, -1 to 1, which represents preference toward 
either the Goal or the Path of the modeled event. Therefore, we will compare inclusion scores for 
Direct imitation and description for this analysis. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was run using age group (two vs. four) and task order 
(imitation first vs. description first) as between subjects factors, and task (Direct imitation vs. 
description) and event component (Manner vs. Path vs. Goal) as within subjects factors, and 
proportion of inclusion as the dependent variable.  A four-way interaction was found between 
component, task, age group, and task order (F(2,54) = 3.66, p = .032).  This finding is similar to 
the three-way interaction found in the description task.  Two-year-olds in the imitation first 
condition describe more Path, and this pattern is not reflected by four-year-olds, description first 
participants, or Direct imitation trials.  This suggests that two-year-olds’ descriptions were 
influenced by task order. 
Summary 
Neither twos nor fours showed preferences toward any event components.  Four-year-
olds correctly imitated all components more, and two-year-olds performed better in the imitation 
first condition, suggesting that they become fatigued after description.  No Global or Local 
effects were found for this phase.  Two-year-olds were neither Path nor Goal biased, while four-
year-olds were strongly Path biased, perhaps demonstrating a Global effect.  Though the patterns 
of encoding events were consistent across age groups, two-year-olds show a Local effect that 
fours do not.  In the imitation first condition, they describe more Path than in the description first 
condition.  Four-year-olds perform similarly in both conditions, but they hit ceiling, obscuring 
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whether they really did not prefer information or were skilled enough simply to encode all event 
components in their descriptions. 
These findings suggest domain specific patterns that were not captured by our initial 
hypotheses about language and thought.  Younger children were Locally influenced in both tasks 
by the first task they undertook, while older children did not perseverate.  They had already 
developed their domain-specific ways of analyzing events to carry out these tasks. 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to investigate the nature of the relationship between language 
and thought by comparing older and younger children’s analyses of space in a linguistic vs. a 
non-linguistic domain.  We expected to find Global or Local effects from language onto non-
linguistic thought.  Furthermore, we suggested that if these effects existed, then older children 
should show different preferences for event components than younger children.  Given that we 
found a Global and a Local effect, it appears as though our third Hypothesis was borne out; 
however, we expected the same effects to appear in both age groups.  Instead, each age group 
unexpectedly demonstrated a different kind of effect.  Older children showed a Global effect – 
they were Path biased in imitation Choice in either condition whereas younger children were not.  
However, we expected this preference to be reflected in their descriptions, which it was not.  
Four-year-olds hit ceiling in the description task, having enough linguistic prowess to describe 
virtually all components of the event. For Local effects, we expected older children to show a 
stronger Local influence from language onto thought because of their more sophisticated 
linguistic resources that they could rely on as a strategy in a non-linguistic task.  However, they 
showed no difference in behavior across conditions in imitation Choice, suggesting no Local 
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effect.  Contrary to expectations, it was the younger participants that showed a Local effect in the 
imitation first condition.  When they imitated first, they included Path more often in their 
descriptions.  
A possible explanation for the Global effect shown only in the older participants’ Choice 
imitations is that gaining language experience does cause a Global effect from language onto 
thought, such that the older children actually do prefer Path in their descriptions and carry this 
preference over into their event representations.  Taking this view, the older children’s linguistic 
Path preference was hidden by their ceiling effect in the description task, which did not force 
them to prioritize components in the same way that the forced imitation choice paradigm did.  In 
order to determine whether older children’s stronger Path bias develops from a more 
sophisticated linguistic perspective or simply a better understanding of the framing of the event, 
a better linguistic bias measure is needed. 
A follow-up study of 16 four-year-olds was conducted at the same satellite research space 
as the current study.  The task was modeled closely on the Choice phase of the imitation task, but 
the children were instead forced to choose between two descriptions of an event.  Children were 
shown a DM event from the same set of clips used in the current description task, and then the 
experimenter showed them two puppets that each provided a description of the event.  One 
puppet described just the Path of the event, and the other just the Goal, and children were asked, 
“Who said it better?”  Because both descriptions were accurate, if the description encoding one 
component is chosen more often than the other we can conclude that that component is more 
important to the child’s understanding of the event in a linguistic domain.  Also, crucially, 
children cannot hit ceiling in this task.  However, from preliminary analysis we found that the 
four-year-olds preferred neither the Path nor the Goal description of events, suggesting that they 
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prefer neither event component.  Perhaps this finding can explain our null effect in the four-year-
old description task, if they described all components at equal levels, than they may not have 
preferred any component of the event in their linguistic analysis. 
The Local effect observed in the younger but not the older children in this study suggests 
that language learning really does change the way tasks in different domains are handled. Two-
year-olds, not having developed a method (rhetorical style) for analyzing the event when 
approaching the task, develop an ad hoc strategy from the onset and use it to complete the 
current and subsequent tasks.  This perseverating strategy looks different depending on what the 
initial domain is.  In the context of the study, when participants described the event first, having 
no rhetorical style to draw from that outlines which event components are more important to 
encode, they chose components at random and formed their utterances.  From the data, we saw 
that they showed no preference for any of the components and included them roughly equally 
often.  Then, when they performed Choice imitation, they also chose which components to 
imitate randomly, showing no preference for either Path or Goal.  On the other hand, participants 
who imitated first were drawn to the Path of the event, perhaps because the ramp was the largest 
and most dynamic piece of the events’ setting, and so described more Path.  Older children did 
not need to rely on ad hoc strategies, they already knew how to analyze an event in a particular 
domain.  Their Path preference in Choice imitation remained regardless of the domain they 
analyzed the event in first. 
Due to some methodological limitations of the study that we did not foresee, a potentially 
informative Global effect from language onto thought was obscured by the ceiling effect 
observed in our four-year-olds' descriptions.  For the younger children, description task was 
difficult enough that for any given movie they were not skilled enough to encode of all of the 
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event components.  This fact created a certain amount of competition between the event 
components as any of them could potentially be described by the speaker.  This competition 
made the task similar to the Choice phase of the imitation task, in which the Path and the Goal 
were directly in conflict with one another.  However, the older children did not need to make this 
choice among components in the description task, as their language skills were sophisticated 
enough to describe all of the event components at once.  The Direct phase of the imitation task 
was similarly easy for both age groups, although the description first two-year-olds perform 
worse, perhaps due to fatigue from the difficult description task.  Although the description and 
Direct imitation tasks were designed to create an equal opportunity to represent any of the event 
components, four-year-olds' inclusion rates were so high that we could not determine whether 
their similar inclusion rates across tasks were due to the design of the tasks or a roughly equal 
interest in all of the event components.  Future directions of this research will need to account for 
the skill of the children in the design, perhaps by presenting them with more complex events, or 
asking them to perform a more difficult task.  For example, consider the following hypothetical 
experiment.  Children are shown simple DM events and then are shown an event in which two of 
the event components have changed and are asked to describe the difference between the two 
events.  If they have prefer one event component over the other in their linguistic analysis of the 
events, they may describe one component more often than the other. 
The relationship between language and thought may be the combination of Global and 
Local influences from one domain onto the other.  As we have seen from the current study, these 
effects can change as children get older and gain language skill depending on the demands of the 
task at hand.   
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